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Abstract 
It has become common practice for retail grocers to charge grocery manufacturers a slot-
ting allowance for placing products on the retail shelf. Manufacturers view the allowance 
as anti-competitive. Retailers view it as compensation for the risks associated with stock-
ing new products. The largely theoretical literature on the subject is consistent with both 
views. This article proposes an empirical model to test the effect of slotting allowances on 
performance, and discusses if and how the model can be tied to the qualitative predictions 
of existing theoretical literature.
1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s, it has become common practice for grocers to charge gro-
cery manufacturers a slotting allowance for placing products on the retail shelf.1 
Estimates of annual expenditures on slotting allowances range from 6 to 9 billion 
US dollars, accounting for about half of product promotion expenditures by man-
ufacturers (Kelly, 1991). As a proportion of product introduction costs, slotting al-
lowances represent 16%, almost the same percentage spent on R&D and market 
research (Lariviere & Parmanabhan, 1997). The amount charged per new product 
is negotiated on an individual basis and may range from a few thousand to a mil-
lion dollars, depending on the product, the size of the manufacturer, the size of 
the retail chain, and whether the chain is regional or national (Pyle, 1995). 
To manufacturers, the allowances represent evidence of retailer market 
power.2 Smaller manufacturers, in particular, consider them as a surrogate for re-
1 Slotting allowances are charges for new as well as existing products. Slotting allowances for existing 
products include “failure fees,” “pay to stay fees,” and “free fills” (Pyle, 1985). 
2 Recently, fresh product wholesalers have asked the Secretary of Agriculture to look into the implica-
tions of slotting allowances and other trade practices for competition in the marketing chain. In re-
sponse, a workshop entitled “Structural Change and Competitiveness in Product Industry: Meth-
odology and Data Requirements” was held in Washington, D.C., on February 19, 1999, to discuss 
alternative empirical methodologies for studying the competitive effects of slotting allowances. 
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tailer price discrimination in favor of their larger rivals, and as a cost-raising strat-
egy by larger manufacturers to “muscle out” the smaller ones (Kelly, 1991). To re-
tailers, the allowances are compensation for the risks associated with adding new 
products to inventory. The verdict from economists is correspondingly mixed. 
To some, the allowances serve the purpose of dampening competition (Shaffer, 
1991). To others, they serve as an instrument of risk-sharing (Sullivan, 1997), sig-
naling/screening (Chu, 1992), and signaling (Lariviere & Parmanabhan, 1997) in 
an uncertain retail environment. 
Shaffer’s (1991) analysis shows that it is more profitable for retailers to extract a 
fixed slotting allowance and pay a higher manufacturer price than to charge no al-
lowance and pay a lower manufacturer price. In the model, perfectly competitive 
manufacturers offer retailers a two-part tariff contract (the wholesale price plus a 
[negative] slotting allowance) and must break even. A retailer accepts a contract 
that maximizes its own profits, given the contracts bought by rivals who must also 
earn non-negative profits. In equilibrium, manufacturers charge a higher wholesale 
price to retailers, and retailers charge a fixed allowance to compensate for lost reve-
nues. A higher wholesale price will induce rivals to charge a higher retail price. So, 
in equilibrium, both the wholesale price and the retail price increase. 
To demonstrate the risk-sharing role of allowances, Sullivan (1997) assumes 
consumer demand is a function of the full price of the product, which includes 
the money price plus consumer search costs. The latter decrease as the number 
of retail products increases. Retailer costs are a function of quantity sold and new 
products. Manufacturer supply of new products depends on the costs of product 
development and production. A rightward shift in the supply of products due, 
for example, to lower development cost increases the number of products, raises 
retail costs, and lowers consumer search costs. Lower search costs translate into a 
higher money price for the quantity sold. If the increase in the retail margin does 
not cover the increase in retail costs, the retailer will charge a slotting or risk-shar-
ing allowance. Observed trends in prices and margins, Sullivan argues, are con-
sistent with the supply-demand model hypothesis, and are indicative of competi-
tive conduct in retailing and manufacturing. 
The premise of Chu’s (1992) paper is that introduction of new products raises 
the problem of asymmetric information: manufacturers with “high demand” 
products (“high types”), and manufacturers with “low demand” products (“low 
types”), are more informed about their respective products than retailers. Chu ex-
amines two scenarios to deal with information asymmetry. In the first scenario, 
the high types move first and signal their confidence in their products through ad-
vertising. In the second, retailers move first and use slotting allowances to screen 
the high types from the low types. In the signaling case, both types “overadver-
tise” and “overprice” relative to the perfect information equilibrium. However, the 
high types may succeed in differentiating themselves from low types when prod-
uct failure has been historically high. In the screening case, only the high types 
will accept a retailer’s offer of a slotting allowance, prices do not increase relative 
to their complete information level, and retailers expropriate the channel surplus. 
Lariviere and Parmanabhan (1997) also consider asymmetric information. This 
time, however, the manufacturer moves first; i.e., offer the allowance to the re-
tailer. The purpose of the allowance is twofold: to signal information about prod-
uct demand and recompense the retailer for the cost of stocking the product. De-
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mand for the product responds to retail price as well as retailer merchandising 
effort. The prediction of Lariviere and Parmanabhan’s model is that the optimal 
contract is a slotting allowance and a lower wholesale price to induce retailer mer-
chandising effort. Retailers who accept the allowance only break even. So, one 
should find, as Lariviere and Parmanabhan did, the average net revenue per unit 
of shelf space to be higher for slotted than unslotted products. However, Lariv-
iere and Parmanabhan do not dismiss the possibility of retailer power in dictating 
slotting allowances. 
Granted that slotting allowances can be rationalized on several grounds, the 
qualitative predictions of the various models remain largely untested. Under-
standably, absence of slotting fee data may limit the scope of meaningful empiri-
cal work. But should data become available, it is not clear how one should proceed 
in discriminating among the competing hypotheses in the literature. A reduced-
form approach is easy to implement but does not guarantee that the empirical re-
sults conform to the underlying model. Structural models are more appropriate 
but, because of nonlinearities, are not easy to implement without overstripping 
simplifications. In this article, I propose one empirically implementable model for 
testing the anti-competitive effects of slotting allowances. Specifically, I use a fairly 
conventional oligopoly model and demonstrate how slotting allowances can be in-
troduced into a price-cost margin equation in a manner similar to introducing con-
tracts for intermediate input (Lukacs, 1997). I also discuss how the parameters of 
the model may relate to the qualitative predictions in the literature. 
2. The Model 
Denote by qij the quantity of a product sold by the ith retailer in the jth retail-
ing region, such that Qj = ∑ i
Nj
=1
 qij is total quantity sold, and Nj is the number of re-
tailers in the jth region. Regional retail demand is represented by the inverse de-
mand function Pj (Qj ) where P is the retail price. Suppose for the moment that, 
instead of charging a manufacturer the usual lump-sum payment, the retailer im-
poses a per-unit slotting allowance Aij . The manufacturer supplies the product 
nationally at wholesale price w. Assuming the relationship between the retail and 
wholesale product is of fixed proportions, retailer profits are: 
πij = Pj (Qj )qij – (w(Q) – Aij )qij – cij qij ,                                (1) 
where Q is the total (national) supply of the product, and cij is (constant) marginal 
cost. The per-unit slotting fee could be viewed either as a negotiated reduction 
from the manufacturer price, or a per-unit rental charge for shelf space. In the lat-
ter case, the retailer sells the product and the shelf space to stock it. 
Differentiation of (1) with respect to qij yields the first order condition 
 (2) 
which can be rewritten as 
 (3) 
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where, for the ith retailer in the jth region, 
= the empirical measure of the price-cost margin,
= 1 + λij , where λij is the ith retailer’s conjectural variation in the jth re-
gional retail market, 
= 1 + θij , where θij is the ith retailer’s conjectural variation in the jth na-
tional wholesale market, 
= the ratio of retailer’s market share in the regional retail product market 
to the regional elasticity of demand. 
= the ratio of retailer’s market share in the national wholesale market to 
the  national elasticity of wholesale supply, and 
=  w/Pj is the wholesale-retail price ratio.
The superscripts r and n stand for national and regional, respectively. 
In practice, retailers negotiate a fixed rather than a per-unit slotting allowance.3 
This implies that the additional revenue Aij qij on the left hand side of equation (3) 
is a lump-sum amount, and hence, does not vary with qij. In that case, profit max-
imization results in the price-cost margin equation 
 (4) 
Note, however, that if the ratio of revenue from the slotting allowance to sales is 
added to both sides of (4), i.e. 
(5) 
one obtains the same expression for the price-cost margin in (3), plus the addi-
tional ratio on the right hand side with the coefficient β3.4 
What equation (5) reveals is that the empirical specification of the price-cost 
margin of a retailer charging slotting allowances should include the retailer’s re-
gional share and national share, elasticities of demand and supply, and the pro-
portion of revenue accounted for by slotting allowances. The familiar measure of 
oligopolistic (oligopsonistic) conduct is captured by β1(β2). Interpretation of the 
effect of slotting allowances on performance, as measured by β3, is not as straight-
forward and merits some discussion. The simplest case is when β3 = 1. Perfor-
mance then is the same in the presence or absence of slotting allowances. The 
more interesting case if when β3 takes values other than 1. Abstracting for now 
from oligopsony power, if one finds no evidence of oligopoly power, but finds 
that β3 = 0 rather than 1, then the retailer is making a normal profit in equilib-
3 This is also consistent with the specification of slotting allowances in the theoretical literature. 
4 Note that since qij is a decision variable, its optimizing level from (3) would not coincide with that 
from equation (5). This implies that the level of Aij  would not be the same in the two equations ei-
ther and, in the lump-sum case, it would be equivalent to the lump-sum allowance divided by the 
quantity sold. 
Sl o t t i n g Al l o w A n c e S A n d Pr i c e-co S t mA r g i n S:  A no t e     421
rium. This would be consistent with Lariviere and Parmanabhan’s (1997) sig-
naling model, Chu’s (1992) screening model, and Sullivan’s (1997) risk-sharing 
model. Recall that, in the first, the optimal contract is a slotting allowance to cover 
retailer stocking costs and a lower wholesale price to induce retailer merchandis-
ing effort. In the second, high type manufacturers pay the allowance to differen-
tiate themselves from the low types. In both cases, retailers simply break even. 
In the third, slotting allowances equate the demand and supply of new products 
with no presumption that retailers have more bargaining power with manufac-
turers or vice-versa. Note that evidence of retail oligopoly power in combination 
with β3 = 0 would still be consistent with the signaling/screening, since retail-
ers still price over marginal cost in both cases. It would not, however, be consis-
tent with Sullivan’s risk-sharing story, where both manufacturers and retailers 
are price takers. 
Evidence of market power in the presence of slotting allowances would, with 
some qualifications, also be consistent with Shaffer’s (1991) predictions. His 
model predicts an increase in the wholesale price, retail price, and retailer rents. 
The source of increased rent, in the presence of slotting allowances, is not oligop-
sony power but the increase in the retail price above its Nash equilibrium level. 
Since the econometric model in this paper is a conjectural oligopoly model of ho-
mogeneous quantity-setting retailers, rather than differentiated retailers who play 
Nash in prices, it would be quite a stretch to infer pricing above the Nash equilib-
rium level from the estimate of β1. However, failure to reject competitive retailer 
conduct in the presence of slotting allowances would not be supportive of Shaf-
fer’s predictions. 
Turning now to oligopsony power, recall that none of the models in the lit-
erature presumed that power on the part of retailers, or any bargaining power 
for that matter. By oligopsony power, I mean retailer ability to lower wholesale 
prices by restricting purchases relative to their competitive level. This is captured 
by the coefficient β2. By retailer bargaining power, I mean retailer ability to de-
press prices without any reduction in quantity. As explained in Blair and Harri-
son (1993), this is equivalent to buyers imposing an all-or-none decision on the 
sellers. The supply curve of sellers, in this case, is the all-or-none supply curve 
which lies below the traditional supply curve (pp. 73–74). This, I suggest, is cap-
tured by the coefficient β3. Hence it is plausible to find no evidence of oligopsony 
power (β2 = 0), or find evidence of both. In other words, an up-front payment, like 
a slotting allowance, to distribute a product can be “dictated” by a retailer with or 
without restricting purchases to obtain a lower wholesale price. 
Admittedly, since the empirical model in this article does not conform directly 
to the various theoretical models underlying the predictions, its link with those 
predictions is rather “loose.” In that sense, the model is a reduced-form “work-
horse” which can either be used to provide indirect evidence of the compet-
ing hypotheses in the literature or used as a stand-alone structure-performance 
model with slotting allowances.5 The ideal model, of course, would be a struc-
tural model that is complex enough to nest all the competing hypotheses, and 
simple enough to estimate its parameters. I leave construction of such model for 
future research. 
5 Estimating the model would require a panel data set of retailers over several regions. 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
In recent years, it has become common practice for retail grocers to charge gro-
cery manufacturers a slotting allowance for placing products on the retail shelf. 
Some manufacturers allege the allowance is anti-competitive. The largely theoret-
ical literature suggests that the allowance can be pro- or anti-competitive. This ar-
ticle proposes a methodology for testing the relationship between slotting allow-
ances and price-cost margins and discusses how it can be tied to the qualitative 
predictions of existing theoretical literature. 
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